Vulnerability
Malicious code in pantheon-agents (PyPI)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1ee06d7aabbdf76969119c2f986e18bbc7f0dcac59ae9cae4f7a04798f2d083d) The package installs `pantheon_agents-setup.pth` into site-packages, which Python auto-executes at every interpreter startup (broader than import-time, fires on any `python` invocation regardless of whether the package is imported). The single-line.pth body wraps its payload in `exec()` of an obfuscated string using systematically renamed single-letter aliased imports (`os as _O`, `tempfile as _T`, `urllib.request as _u`, `subprocess as _s`, `platform as _p`, etc.), which hides `urllib.request.urlretrieve`, `zipfile` extraction, `os.chmod`, and `subprocess.run` from static AST inspection. The payload downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods it 0o775, and runs it against a `_index.js` file resolved by glob across `pantheon/*/_index.js`. A sentinel file at `/tmp/.bun_ran` gates re-execution. Two compounding harms: (1) Python startup performs unconditional outbound network fetch and writes/executes a fetched binary outside Python's view — the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern; (2) any sibling package (or future update) that drops a file at `pantheon/*/_index.js` is silently executed by the dropped Bun binary at every Python startup, providing a persistent execution sink. The combination of `.pth` auto-execution, `exec()`-wrapped obfuscation, and remote-runtime fetch+execute is a textbook supply-chain-attack fingerprint. ## Source: kam193 (57f0e964aed446fe82998f13d1cbc577bff274378d980b551e4c134d093ab016) Versions 0.6.1, 0.6.2 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions
No CVSS base score from NVD or GHSA yet. NVD typically scores within 24–72 hours of publication; GHSA usually within a day for OSS-flagged CVEs. Last record update .
For interim severity, fall back on KEV / EXPLOIT signals and the EPSS percentile (lower panel). Re-check this CVE after one cron tick — the score lands automatically when the source publishes.
FIRST.org publishes EPSS daily. Coverage isn't universal — pre-disclosure CVEs and reserved IDs don't carry an EPSS score until at least one exploitation signal lands. Score will appear within 24 hours of the next EPSS pull.
No exploitation, limited impact or prevalence