Vulnerability
curl/libcurl: sensitive HTTP server headers also sent to proxies
libcurl provides applications a way to set custom HTTP headers to be sent to the server by using `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`. A similar option is available for the curl command-line tool with the '--header' option. When the connection passes through an HTTP proxy the same set of headers is sent to the proxy as well by default. While this is by design, it has not necessarily been clear nor understood by application programmers. Such tunneling over a proxy is done for example when using the HTTPS protocol - or when explicitly asked for. In this case, the initial connection to the proxy is made in clear including any custom headers using the HTTP CONNECT method. While libcurl provides the `CURLOPT_HEADEROPT` option to allow applications to tell libcurl if the headers should be sent to host and the proxy or use separate lists to the different destinations, it has still defaulted to sending the same headers to both parties for the sake of compatibility. If the application sets a custom HTTP header with sensitive content (e.g., authentication cookies) without changing the default, the proxy, and anyone who listens to the traffic between the application and the proxy, might get access to those values. Note: this problem does not exist when using the `CURLOPT_COOKIE` option (or the `--cookie` option) or the HTTP auth options, which are always sent only to the destination server.
No CVSS 3.x base score yet. Since April 2026 NVD only enriches priority CVEs (KEV, federal and critical software), so most CVEs are scored only if the assigning CNA included a score in the CVE record, or by GHSA for open-source packages. Last record update .
For interim severity, fall back on KEV / EXPLOIT signals and the EPSS percentile (lower panel). Re-check this CVE after one cron tick — the score lands automatically when the source publishes.
Mid-pack — moderate exploitation likelihood.
No VEX statements published for CVE-2015-3153. Vendors publish VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) to assert per-product whether a CVE is actually exploitable in their distribution.
No exploitation, limited impact or prevalence